How did European merchants finance the Commercial Revolution? The principal narrative highlights a role for commenda contracts in enabling merchants to share risks and mobilize investment for long-distance trade. This study illuminates tradeoffs merchants and their agents encountered in choosing between equity-like schemes (commenda) and debt financing. The study works out of a dataset of 1,823 maritime contracts that span 2,676 unique contracting dyads (principal-agent pairs). The study demonstrates that it was debt, not commenda, that financed trade on the frontiers of the trade economy. It further demonstrates that most trade was conducted through one-shot relationships, not repeated relationships. The results delimit the roles of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms in enabling long-distance trade.
Introduction
Well before economists had explicitly distinguished an economics of contracting, business historians had illuminated a role for principal-agent contracts in enabling gains from complex exchange. They had, for example, crafted a narrative about how merchants exploited a technology of contracting and innovations in accounting to mobilize investment for longdistance trade in the Late Middle Ages. The narrative depends on a sequence of four ideas: long-distance trade was a catalyst of an economic revival in the Mediterranean, merchants came to depend on agents to conduct transactions in geographically-dispersed markets, equity-like schemes known generically as commenda contracts enabled merchants and their agents to share risk, and risk-sharing enabled merchants and their agents to attract investment for long-distance trade ventures.
The focus on principal-agent contracts and trade in the Late Middle Ages derived from a direct examination of the extant paper trail that commercial activity generated. Historians trolling through the archived records of European merchants could not but help notice the preponderance of documents pertaining to overseas trade and notice that many of these documents were commenda contracts. What the paper trail leaves out, however, is direct evidence of how merchants accommodated the prospect that their agents might cheat them. Indeed, working through networks of agents may have enabled merchants to distribute their investments and managerial energies across portfolios of ventures. Portfolio effects alone may have constituted an effective means of managing risks and encouraging merchants to invest in overseas trade in the first place, but agency secured under the terms of commenda contracts introduced a problem of asymmetric information. A difficulty with the equity-like compensation that commenda afforded is that it depended on agents' reports of transactions that merchants could neither observe nor verify ex post. Agents might cheat by underreporting proceeds gained in transactions. Without some means of neutralizing or, at least, accommodating the problem of cheating, merchants might not be able to realize portfolio effects and to mobilize investment for overseas trade.
Cheating is interesting, because it motivates questions about what might constitute "some means" of governing exchange. It motivates questions about the governance of contractual relations -questions for which the extant paper trail has yielded few answers. The structure of the governance problem is generic: Gains from trade often depended on one party yielding to another party information that was relevant to both parties' payoffs. Information, of course, was susceptible to distortion, and distortion may have enabled agents to cheat. Anticipating this, vulnerable parties may have underinvested in a commercial venture or might have foregone exchange entirely thus denying all parties potential gains from exchange. To encourage investment, all parties together may have instituted governance structures that enabled those parties involved in transmitting information to credibly commit to maintaining the integrity of information.
To my knowledge, it was not until the seminal work of Avner Greif on the Maghribi traders that economic historians had explicitly focused research on governance problems relating to long-distance trade in the Middle Ages. It turns out that focusing on these problems can provide new insights into the old problem of understanding how merchants enabled longdistance trade. That is not to say that historians had been insensitive to the prospect that agents might cheat. Indeed, they appealed to the idea that merchants would have relied on kinship relations to bind agents. Even so, I do something in this paper that business historians may have been less well-equipped to do: I distinguish evidence from a dataset of contracts representing cross-sections of maritime activity. Specifically, I characterize discrete patterns exhibited in a dataset of 1,823 principal-agent contracts that spans two contexts.
1 One context involves trade ventures extending from Venice to the Eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea in the years 1190-1220. The contract data from these years will allow us to evaluate the role of kinship relations in enabling long-distance trade. The second context involves the financing of long-distance trade extending from Venetian Crete to the Aegean, the Black Sea and other parts of the Eastern Mediterranean in the 14 th century. The contract data from both contexts will enable us to conduct natural experiments about the role of information in supporting trade ventures organized by means of commenda contracts and debt.
The data yield discrete patterns that are difficult to reconcile with the established narrative. First, 849 of the 1,823 contracts (47%) in the dataset are debt contracts. Debt constituted an important tool in the merchant's contracting toolbox and, yet, the established narrative has little or nothing to say about it. That is not to say that important dimensions of the narrative, such as risk-sharing, were not important, but the narrative fails to indicate tradeoffs (if any) merchants and their agents may have perceived in choosing between debt financing and commenda. Second, the data indicate that appealing to kinship relations does provide clues to how merchants organized long-distance trade. It turns out, however, that the clues also point up considerations the established narrative does not feature. Rather than exploit kinship relations to bind agents and mitigate cheating, merchants exploited trade ventures to enable family relations to build up capital of their own and to gain experience doing business overseas.
How might one understand these discrete patterns? The paper presents a contract selection hypothesis, a two-part thesis about the role of information and institutions in supporting longdistance trade. First, the choice between debt and commenda featured tradeoffs. Commenda may have afforded risk-sharing, but it also afforded agents opportunities to expropriate returns that would have otherwise have obtained to their merchants. Debt may have denied contracting parties the advantages of risk-sharing, but it resolved the governance problem by finessing it. An agent may very well misrepresent transactions, but debt yielded to merchants payoffs that were invariant to agents' reports. Second, merchants and their agents aligned commenda and debt with underlying attributes of trade ventures in a discriminating way. Commenda lined up with ventures for which merchants had access to informal sources of information. Merchants used them, for example, to finance ventures that involved commodities, such as pepper, that agents commonly acquired in markets commonly attended by other agents. Informal information gave merchants some capacity to detect cheating if not to verify it. An agent might misrepresent transactions, but other agents, including other merchants' agents, might yield reports of commodities prices against which a merchant might compare any one agent's report. A deviant report might not constitute evidence of cheating that parties could exploit in formal enforcement processes, but it could provide a basis for informal sanctions. In contrast, debt emerges as the mode of financing of last resort: merchants and their agents used it to finance ventures in which merchants had no means of detecting (much less verifying) cheating.
The remainder of the paper proceeds in five parts. The first characterizes the established historical narrative and outlines more recent contributions in economic history to the problem of mitigating cheating. The first part also links the contract selection hypothesis to literatures on financial structure and contract design. The second part describes the data and the environments from which they were generated. The third part discusses salient patterns in the data and how the contract selection hypothesis provides a way of understanding these patterns. The discussion sets up the fourth part. Part four features multinomial probit analyses of contract selection. The fourth part concludes.
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Historical Narratives The historiography of medieval contracting practices goes back to at least the mid-nineteenth century. Werner Sombart had yet to introduce the term "Capitalism" in Der moderne Kapitalismus (1902) , but historians had already taken on the project of documenting what one might understand as the medieval foundations of capitalism. (Tucci 1962 . See also Sayous 1929 for a thumbnail sketch and selected bibliography of studies relating to Venice, Genoa, and Florence. See Brătianu 1927 pp. 13-18 for a richer bibliography of earlier studies.) Early and mid-twentieth century research included efforts to catalog types of contracting practices. (See, for example Byrne 1916; Bensa 1925; Hoover 1926; Sayous 1929 Sayous , 1934 Lopez 1937; Luzzatto 1937; Edler de Roover 1941; and Vaccari 1954 .) Some of these same researchers and later researchers focused efforts on assembling narratives about how the medieval trade economy worked.
Even though earlier researchers had distinguished equity-like schemes (commenda) and debt among the types of contracts merchants would use to finance trade ventures and compensate trading agents, later researchers did not pick up on questions about why merchants would sometimes use debt and other times use commenda. Instead, debt contracts hardly make it into the established narratives about how merchants and their agents organized long-distance trade.
The Principal Historical Narrative
The principal historical narrative illuminates a role for principal-agent contracts in enabling a revival of trade in the Mediterranean in the Late Middle Ages. (See, for example, Pirenne 1925, p. 110; de Roover 1963, p. 43; Lopez 1971, p. 73; Kedar 1976, p. 25; Pryor 1983 p. 133; and Hunt and Murray 1999, p. 55.) By the middle of the 1970's historians had synthesized from a century of archival research a thesis about how merchants and their agents enabled an expansion of trade in the Mediterranean. The kernel of the argument is that organizing trade ventures by means of commenda contracts enabled the functionaries of trade to share risk and, in turn, to realize gains that risk-averse parties operating alone with their own resources would otherwise have passed up.
The historical thesis joins concepts of trust and risk-sharing in explaining the role of commenda in enabling the revival of trade of the Commercial Revolution. Historians have been sensitive to the prospect that agents retained under the terms of a commenda contract might cheat their investors. The principal conclusion of the literature on this count is that investors could resort to commenda contracts if they could hire honest agents (Lane 1964 , de Roover 1963 , Lopez and Raymond 1955 , Hunt and Murray 1999 or family members (North 1991 , Byrne 1916 . Investors could, of course, trust honest agents to report gains or losses honestly, and family bonds, presumably, would again encourage agents to render truthful reports. The next part of the thesis indicates how commenda enabled an expansion of trade. The idea is that contracts featuring risk-sharing enabled contracting parties to participate in ventures yielding the most uncertain returns. (Lane 1973a , p. 139, Kedar 1976 For example, in characterizing contracting practices in the 13th and early 14th centuries, both Frederic Lane and Benjamin Kedar distinguish between ventures conducted within a physically secure "inner-core zone" conforming to most of the Eastern Mediterranean and an "outer zone" conforming to the frontiers of the inner-core and beyond into India and Central Asia. Agents venturing beyond the inner-core would have faced both greater physical hazards and greater uncertainty over the availability of commercial prospects.
Taken together, trust and risk-sharing enabled the functionaries of trade to realize gains that risk-averse parties would have otherwise foregone. At least three difficulties with this thesis are (1) it does not explicitly address the trade-offs encountered in choosing commenda over debt contracts or vice-versa, (2) it neither recognizes nor rationalizes the role of yet other types of contracts that appear in the data, and (3) it is motivated by heavy interpretations assigned to no more than two anecdotes that have been heavily cited in the literature. The first anecdote relates to the experiences of the Venetian Giovanni Loredan in India. Lopez (1943) indicated that in 1338-1339 Giovanni Loredan ventured to India via the Black Sea with financing provided by family members by commenda contracts. This example of traveling to the "outer zone" under a commenda has been presented in Lopez (1943 Lopez ( , 1951 Lopez ( , 1955 Lopez ( , 1971 , Lopez and Raymond (1955) , Lane (1973a) , and Kedar (1976) as evidence of the role of the commenda in enabling long distance trade. Meanwhile, Kedar (1976) and Lopez (1951) indicate the venture of the Genoese Benedetto Vivaldi and his brother in 1315 to India under the terms of a commenda contract as further evidence. Kedar (1976, p. 25) explicitly outlines the thesis with these two examples: "In the outer zone, the prevalent form of partnership was the commenda, or as the Venetians usually called it, the colleganza… This form of partnership… was perfectly suited to the commercial trips to the distant, only partially known lands of Further Asia. Indeed, both of the commercial voyages to India about which the financial details are known -the voyages of the Genoese Benedetto Vivaldi in 1315 and of the Venetian Giovanni Loredan in 1339 -were undertaken by men who entered into commenda contracts."
The two anecdotes are suggestive but alone do not provide a foundation upon with to establish a theory of contract selection.
2 In contrast, this paper advances a simple contract selection hypothesis then does two things that no study on medieval contracting has yet done: (1) it makes the hypothesis stand up to a sizable, representative data set of contracts, and (2) it makes the hypothesis stand up to a large dataset of unpublished contracts. The reader should not discount this second point. There is a distinct bias in the selection of cartularies that have been published. Editors tend to choose to edit cartularies that are short and that feature less complex documents. 
The Governance Narrative
One reason the principal historical narrative may not have featured a role for debt financing is that historians did not have tools for characterizing tradeoffs between debt and equity. Among other things, historians had, for the most part, been working implicitly out of a contract-as-promise framework. According to such a perspective of contracting, one party to a contract may promise to perform X, Y, and Z. Failure to perform invites appeals to (frictionless) formal enforcement processes, and these processes enable counter-parties to redress breaches or to impose sanctions. Under such a framework, it is not obvious how one might characterize tradeoffs between debt and equity. In contrast, it would be natural for researchers working out of a contract-as-framework perspective (Llewellyn 1931) to recognize tradeoffs. The prospect that agents may cheat their merchants introduces broad scope for governance by, among other things, enabling a richer examination of the role of both formal and informal enforcement processes. One need take only one further step to suggest that the choice of financial structure (debt or equity) can itself affect the form governance takes.
No researchers had taken up how the choice of financial structure could affect governance, but Grief (1989 Grief ( , 1993 explicitly takes up the problem of cheating with respect to long distance trade and suggests how informal processes -specifically, reputation mechanismscould enable merchants to accommodate the problem of cheating.
Reputation mechanisms constitute one class of mechanisms parties might use to support exchange. They depend on repeated interactions between parties, on flows of information parties use to detect cheating, and on sanctions parties use to redress or punish cheating (Bull 1987) . Folk Theorem results derived from the theory of supergames (Sorin 1992) suggest that it can be easy to rationalize any number of practices and institutions as reputation mechanisms. Theory can motivate multiple equilibria, leaving theorists stuck with looking for criteria according to which parties might select one candidate equilibrium over another. The upshot is that theory alone may provide little descriptive, predictive or prescriptive content. Even so, empirical research suggests that people who were unencumbered with academic concerns about multiplicity of equilibria managed to institute and maintain reputation mechanisms. (See Greif 1989 , 1993 for path-breaking economic analysis of the experiences of the Maghribi traders documented in Goitein 1967 and 1973.) Further research suggests that formal institutions such as the Law Merchant may have enabled parties to implement and maintain informal reputation mechanisms (Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990) .
It is not obvious that reputation mechanisms served much of a role in ordering trade ventures that European merchants had organized -a topic that Greif (1994) takes up -but that raises the question of how European merchants accommodated the problem of cheating. North (1991, p. 106) suggests how one might build on the principal historical narrative and incorporate the governance problem:
"The traditional resolution of this [governance] problem in medieval and early modern times was the use of kinship and family ties to bind agents to principals. However, as the size and scope of merchant trading empires grew, the extension of discretionary behavior to others than kin of the principal required the development of more elaborate accounting procedures for monitoring the behavior of agents."
North's statement appeals to the role of kinship relations in enabling long-distance trade, but it also builds on the idea that reaching beyond kinship relations and making the shift to more impersonal exchange enabled merchants to expand trade. The statement also suggests a role of information secured by means of accounting in policing cheating.
The contract selection hypothesis
The principal historical narrative does not take up the governance problem. The existing governance narrative, of course, makes governance the focus of analysis, but it leaves out an account of how merchants detected cheating in the first place. Reputation effects, for example, would have depended on merchants being able to detect (if not verify) cheating.
Indeed, as Bull (1987, p. 148) observes, "[R]eputation effects are only as strong as the information flows that support them," but it is not obvious what could have constituted accounting procedures that would have enabled merchants to detect distortions in agents' reports of transactions.
There do exist indications that accounting procedures may have served a role in mitigating other types of cheating -specifically, cheating derived from claims agents might make that cargoes had been spoiled or otherwise compromised during transit. Italian merchant vessels often featured ship-board scribes whose maintained records of quantity and condition of cargoes that agents both loaded and unloaded. Other than that, it is not obvious that contracting parties could have depended on accounting procedures to neutralize cheating. Information remained susceptible to manipulation, limiting parties to nothing more than suasion to discourage cheating. In some Italian jurisdictions, for example, notaries could have faced the prospect of being burned at the stake for falsifying documents (Brătianu 1927, p. 32 ).
This study complements both the principal historical narrative and the formative governance narrative by introducing a contract selection hypothesis. The contract selection hypothesis derives naturally from focusing on the problem of detecting cheating. Examining the problem of mitigating cheating leads inexorably to the selection of equity-like schemes (commenda) and debt. The selection of debt or equity provides a way of characterizing much of the variation in principal-agent contracts that earlier research has ignored, and it provides a way of improving our understanding of how merchants ultimately financed the Commercial Revolution.
The contract selection hypothesis builds on earlier research in economics on the relationship between financial structure and governance. Modigliani and Miller (1958) had pointed out that while it is intuitively plausible to suggest that financial structure and governance are related, the standard tools of economics did not provide a way of characterizing the relationship. Their remarkable result was that, when viewed through the lens of established economic theory, the choice between debt and equity financing was irrelevant. Later research such as Jensen and Meckling (1976 ), Myers (1977 ), and Myers and Majluf (1984 appealed to newer theory to suggest how problems of asymmetric information and moral hazard could rescue the relevance of financial structure by illuminating governance tradeoffs between the choice of debt or equity financing. Williamson (1988) appealed to a transaction costs logic to suggest how governance tradeoffs could motivate an empirically testable contract selection hypothesis. Williamson (1988) ties the selection of debt and equity to the degree to which gains from exchange are relationship-specific. In the environment he considers, the governance attending equity financing facilitates the efforts of parties to adapt their relationship to contingencies realized over the course of long-term exchange. In contrast, debt grants to an outside party (e.g., the bank) some discretion over the decision to wrap up the parties' collaboration and to liquidate assets. Insofar as liquidating would entail dissipation of relationship-specific value, then equity might dominate. The tradeoff is that the governance attending equity might require more costly institutional supports.
The environment examined here parallels those of the models of "costly state verification" inspired by Townsend (1979) and the model of "costly state falsification" introduced by Crocker and Morgan (1998) . These environments feature a problem of ex post asymmetric information in that contracting parties must commit to terms of contract before some party learns payoff-relevant information. 4 Townsend and later authors consider relationships between financial structure and (costly) institutional supports such as auditing schemes. Crocker and Morgan examine the relationship between financial structure and agents' cheating technology. Insofar as cheating itself may entail some cost, agents might opt to reveal information truthfully. So long as a principal knows an agent's cheating technology, the parties might be able to design a contract isomorphic to a "direct mechanism" by which agents reveal private information.
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What happens when auditing is infeasible at any cost or investors' know nothing of agents' cheating technologies? That is, what happens when contracting parties have no instruments other than the compensation scheme? The situation corresponds something to the converse of the problem explored in Williamson (1988) . Williamson (1988) is occupied with the question of the endogeneity of institutional supports: why would parties to exchange might bother assemble costly mechanisms for supporting their relationship? However, when it is not possible to endogenize supports -that is, when it would be prohibitively costly to assemble institutional supports such as costly auditing shemes -contracting parties are left with the prospect of abandoning exchange or with adapting the choice of contract to features of the environment.
Of most interest would be features that they could use to support exchange. For example, maritime republics of the Mediterranean traditionally made a point of formalizing trading relationships with other important trade sites. Formalized relationships included terms by which visiting merchants could trade locally as well as agreements by which foreign merchants could setup a permanent, physicial presence called a fondaco. In 1173, for example, the Venetian Republic established a fondaco in Alexandria, Egypt, a site at which Venetian merchants could secure lodging and organize transactions.
The Venetian Republic also sponsored regular merchant convoys that traveled between Venice and Egypt, and it was the combination of regular (and regulated) commercial traffic (state-sponsored convoys) and a regular physical presence (a fondaco) in such important ports as Alexandria that enabled afforded Venetian merchants some means to monitor their trading agents. Trading agents venturing from Venice to Egypt were operating in the presence of other agents who would be trading in the same commodities. They would have symmetrical access to facilities and information. Knowing this, investors situated in Venice could exploit the reports of other parties to gauge the performance of their own agents and detect, if not verify, cheating. And, knowing that, agents could be expected to refrain from cheating. In such transparent environments, parties could afford to organize trade ventures under the terms of commenda contracts. In less transparent environments, parties might forgo exchange or adopt debt financing.
Insofar as maintaining transparency involved maintaining both a regular stream of trade and a physical presence in an overseas site, then the trade between Venice and Egypt through most of the 13 th century was exceptional. In contrast, most the trade activity examined in this paper was episodic. Local authorities might commit to formal trade treaties, but the inability or unwillingness of these same authorities to contain piracy or other predations could frustrate trade. Such was the experience, for example, with the important trade between Venetian Crete and Turkish emirates in the Aegean. The emirates of Aydin and Menteshe periodically renewed trade treaties with Crete. The renewals, however, were responses to breakdowns -breakdowns induced by larger events and currents such as fits of anti-Turkish crusading in the Aegean. Even the trade between Venice and Egypt itself eventually reverted to fitfulness and instability. After the Mamluke takeover of Egypt in 1291, the formerly stationary trade reverted to the kind of episodic trade that became prevailent throughout the Eastern Mediterranean. Attending the reversion to episodic trade was a reversion from commenda financing to debt financing.
The data exercises that follow involve characterizing contract selection in environments involving episodic trade activity and environment involving stationary trade activity.
The Data
The data from 1278-1400 (1,701 contracts) derive from the logbooks ("cartularies") of 28 notaries maintained at the State Archives of Venice. (See Table 1 .) All of these data pertain to trade ventures that merchants operating out of Crete had organized. The records of only five notaries have been published: Angelo de Cartura, Donato Fontanella, Leonardo Marcello, Pietro Pizolo, and Zaccaria de Fredo. The records of these five notaries account for 309 of the 1,701 contracts (18.2%). One can find the records of all of notaries in the archival series Notai in Candia maintained at the State Archives. The remaining data (122 contracts) from the years 1190-1220 derive from the archival series the Cancelleria Inferiore maintained at the State Archives. These data do not derive from notaries' cartularies but derive from contracts that individuals had maintained in family archives. Most of the contracts pertain to trade ventures originating in Venice, although a few ventures originated in other sites such as Constantinople. All of the contracts have been transliterated in a series titled the Codice Diplomatico Veneziano, and all but one of these contracts have been published in Morozzo della Rocca and Lombardo, eds., Documenti del Commercia Veneziano nei Secoli XI -XIII (1940) and Lombardo and Morozzo della Rocca, eds., Nuovi Documenti del Commercio Veneto dei Secoli XI -XIII (1953).
1278-1400
The data from 1278-1400 indicate that in some years the records of particular notaries featured a high proportion of maritime contracts -sometimes more than 5% of all contractsbut in other years very few maritime contracts appear. From these data I indicate three types of contracts: commenda, debt, and contracts I have labeled "pooling contracts." The one dimension that distinguishes these types from each other is the rule by which principals and agents share total surplus. Under the terms of commenda contracts, parties split proceeds in fixed proportions such as half-and-half, two-thirds-and-one-third, and, less often, threequarters-and-one-quarter. Debt contracts made agents the residual claimant; agents would guarantee fixed payoffs (principal plus interest) to their investors. Pooling contracts read just like commenda and debt contracts, except that they indicate payoffs as a function of the number of shares (partes) in a vessel that the parties have purchased.
6 Pooling contracts show up in the records of many notaries starting in 1339, a year of renewed warring with Turks in the Aegean (Zachariadou 1983) . The relative frequency of pooling contracts is greatest in 1347, the year in which the first wave of plague of the sequence of waves we know as the Black Death invaded the Aegean. Pooling contracts disappear in the succeeding few years.
Parties seem to have used pooling contracts in environments that were subject to extraordinary physical hazards. Investors may very well have been concerned that any one agent might not to able to return and to remit payments. More importantly, parties seem to have used pooling contracts in non-stationary environments in which negative shocks to the informational structure of the trade economy rendered commercial prospects difficult to ascertain.
All contracts feature the following types of information:
1.
The identities and towns of residence of the investors. 2.
The identities and towns of residence of the agents. 3.
Investments on the part of investors in kind or in specie. 4.
The rule by which parties share profits and losses. 5.
The assignment of losses from spoilage or piracy to the investors or agents. 6.
Date of enactment. 7.
Contract duration: the time by which the agents must dispatch their obligations. 8.
The identities of witnesses to the contract. 9.
The identity of the notary assembling the contract.
Contracts often feature other terms:
10. An itinerary agents are supposed to follow.
11. An explicit indication that the agent surrenders the option to deviate from a stated itinerary. 12. The specific vessel by which an agent must travel.
The contracts from 1278 -1400 number 777 commenda, 119 pooling contracts, and 805 debt contracts. Important destinations include included Palatia (formerly Miletus), the principal port of the Turkish emirate of Menteshe on the Anatolian Peninsula (289 contracts), and Theologo (formerly Ephesus) the principal port of the Turkish Beylik of Aydin (47 contracts). Egypt (Alexandria or Damietta), Rhodes, and Cyprus show up in 123, 104, and 120 contracts respectively. Most other contracts involve trade with islands in the Aegean. Often contracts would not indicate an itinerary or might even explicitly indicate that agents would reserve complete discretion over the selection of destinations.
1190-1220
An advantage of the data from 1190-1220 is that they tend to feature more detail than the data from the 14 th century notaries' cartularies. They tended to indicate whether or not the agent was to travel with a state sponsored convoy. Also, contracts tended to be more explicit about family relations, if any, between the contracting parties. Even so, some of the data derive not from contracts but from receipts by which parties to a venture formally acknowledged the accounting of the results of a venture. Receipts sometimes left out details that would otherwise have been relevant to the analysis.
The contracts are much like those from 1278-1400 with two important exceptions. The data do not include any pooling contracts, and they include two types of commenda. One type, which authors sometimes recognize as unilateral commenda, were just like those parties used in 1278-1400. Authors recognize other commenda as bilateral commenda, the principal difference being that agents also contributed some share, usually one quarter, of the financing to the venture. Normally agents participating in a unilateral commenda could expect to receive one quarter of the proceeds. Agents contributing one quarter of the financing usually secured one half of the reported profits.
Fifty-six of the 122 documents are original contracts with the remaining 66 being composed of receipts. Fifty-two, 26, and 44 of the documents corresponded, respectively, to unilateral commenda, bilateral commenda, and debt.
Salient Patterns in the Data
The data allow us to distinguish a number of patterns that illuminate the problem of detecting cheating in principal-agent contracts. I distinguish four patterns. The first relates to the trade with Egyptian ports. The second features trade relations between Venetian Crete and Turkish Beyliks on the Anatolian peninsula in the 14 th century. The third illuminates the role of convoys sponsored by the Venetian Republic in facilitating the flow of information about commodities prices. The fourth features the role of family relations in enabling long-distance trade. The fifth describes the prevalence of repeat relationships and one-shot contracts.
The Trade with Egypt
The data from 1278-1400 and 1190-1220 allow us to conduct a natural experiment. The two data sets reveal the financial structure of trade with Egyptian ports in two different environments. (See Table 2 .) The data from 1190-1220 indicate that 18 of the 122 contracts involved trade with Egypt. Eleven of these 18 documents indicate explicitly that contracting parties coordinated their trade ventures with state sponsored convoys, although it is likely that all or nearly all of the 18 trade ventures were coordinated around the convoys. 7 What is striking is that 15 of the 18 contracts (83%) were commenda. Even more striking is the contrast of these data with the data from 1278-1400. One-hundred eight of the 1,511 from 1278-1400 explicitly involved trade ventures to Egypt. One hundred of these 108 contracts (93%) were debt contracts.
The contract selection hypothesis provides a way of understanding the stark contrast between contract selection in the 1190-1220 interval and 1278-1400. The Egyptian trade in 1190-1220 constituted a stationary environment, and commenda contracts prevailed. The Egyptian trade in 1278-1400 was subject to much disruption, and debt contracts dominated. The remainder of this subsection is occupied with substantiating the contrast between the two environments.
Egypt had always been a nexus of intra and extra Mediterranean trade. As the principal granary of the Eastern Mediterranean and as a conduit for goods coming from India and other parts further east, it was natural for Venetian merchants and other European merchants to have developed commercial relations and experience in Egypt going back centuries.
8 By 1190-1220, the Venetian Republic already an established history sponsoring annual merchant convoys that would make the round trip from Venice, to Egypt, the Levant and Venice again. 7 Thirteen of the 18 documents are receipts, and 5 are original contracts. Four of the 5 original contracts explicitly mention state sponsored convoys whereas only 7 of the thirteen receipts explicitly indicate convoys. The suggestion is that receipts were less likely to indicate whether or not contracting parties had coordinated completed ventures with state sponsored convoys. 8 Venice's commercial relationship with Egypt extends at least to the 9 th century. Indeed, part of the lore of Venice is that Venetian merchants absconded with the body of Saint Mark the Evangelist from Alexandria in 828.
Over the centuries, the Republic variously regulated the convoys, but what is important for our purposes is this: the Republic coordinated trade fairs in Venice and convoys with seasonal commodities markets in Egypt and the Levant. Merchants' agents ended up traveling together to participate collectively (if not cooperatively) in commodities markets at sites such as Alexandria and Dammieta. They generally returned with these convoys to resell commodities such as pepper they had acquired in trade fairs in Venice. Other European merchants, including other Italians, would acquire these goods for distribution elsewhere in Europe. By the 14 th century the Republic started to sponsor convoys that traveled between Venice and northern Europe, thus affording merchants the opportunity to re-export goods acquired from the Eastern Mediterranean to European ports beyond the Mediterranean.
In 1190-1220, trade relations between Venice and the authorities in Egypt were secure, and state sponsored convoys were routine.
9 Agents would end up traveling together to participate in the trade of the same commodities (principally pepper), and they would end up commonly informed about commodities prices. An agent might represent specific transactions he had conducted on the behalf of merchants in Venice, but other agents might yield to those same merchants parallel reports of transactions they had conducted. An agent might cheat, but parallel reports would provide some scope for detecting information. Informal reports of prices may not have enabled merchants to appeal to formal processes to police cheating, but they may have enabled parties to appeal to informal processes such as reputation mechanisms or violence. Informal mechanisms, in turn, could have supported contracts featuring risksharing.
The interval 1190-1220 constituted a stationary environment in which to conduct trade in Egypt. In contrast, in most of the interval 1278-1400 the trade with Egypt was subject to much flux. In 1291 the Mamlukes seized control in Egypt and overran the remaining Crusader holdings in the Levant. At one stroke European traders lost their two principal points of East-West exchange. The Venetians responded with two parallel initiatives. They made efforts to secure trade relations with the new authorities in Egypt, and they fought a war with the Genoese for control of access to the one remaining nexus of East-West exchange, the Black Sea. The Pope had banned trade with the Mamlukes, but by 1300 the Venetians had gone ahead and established trade relations with the Mamluke Sultan in Egypt and had settled on an uneasy peace with the Genoese.
By 1322 the Venetians bowed to papal pressure to suspend merchant convoys to Egypt. The Republic did not again sponsor a convoy to Egypt until 1344. By that time, much of Italy had already suffered years of severe famine. Much of the Republic's energies were occupied with securing grain. Grain supplies from the Black Sea had already been compromised, because in 1343 the Khan of the Golden Horde had expelled the Venetians and other western merchants from the Venetian trade colony at Tana and had started the siege of the Genoese colony at Caffa on the Crimea. The situation enabled the Venetians to convince the Pope to allow them send a merchant convoy to Egypt.
Between 1344 and 1369 the Venetians periodically managed to secure approvals from the Pope to organize convoys. Ashtor (1976) suggests that these convoys were not always well attended, but by 1370 Venice managed to normalize trade relations with the Mamluke Sultan in Egypt. The Pope had lifted the ban on trade with the Mamlukes, thus relieving the Venetians of having to secure Papal approvals for each proposed convoy.
Merchants operating out of Crete did organize ventures to Egypt in both the intervals 1344-1369 and 1370-1400. War and plague conspired to complicate and sometimes frustrate longdistance trade. The first wave of the sequence of plagues we know as the Black Death invaded the Aegean from Central Asia and the Black Sea in 1347. The Venetian authorities in Crete had been occupied with organized naval fleets to fight against coalitions of Turkish Beyliks in the Aegean, but by the spring of 1347, the rate and volume of mortality had been great enough such that the authorities had to shift their attentions to the problem of disposing of the dead. (Vidulich 1976 ) Plague went on to ravage Italy in 1348 and the remainder of Western Europe in the succeeding years. A major outbreak occurred again in the 1360's.
In 1350-1354 the Venetians fought another war with Genoa, the Third Genoese War, over access to the Black Sea. Hostilities included both parties harassing and seizing the maritime commercial traffic of the other. The Fourth Genoese War of 1376-1381 brought the focus of hostilities virtually to Venice itself. Venice ended up ceding many of its holdings along the Dalmatian coast of the Adriatic, but Venice did hold on to other sites, such as Corfu, through which it could continue to service its naval and commercial fleets as they entered and exited the Adriatic. Historians suggest that it was only after this Fourth Genoese War that Venice's trade with the East really began to take off. (See, for example, Ashtor 1975 By that time, the Venetians had already diverted some traffic through new links of new chains of East-West trade such as its Beirut convoy line.
The Trade with the Beyliks of Aydin and Menteshe
The trade between Crete and the Turkish beyliks of Menteshe and Aydin reveals discrete patterns that are consistent with the contract selection hypothesis. War in the Aegean between shifting coalitions of Turkish beyliks, Catalan interlopers and shifting coalitions of other non-Muslim factions -Genoese factions, Venetian factions, the Knights of the Hospital of St. Thomas, and the Byzantine authorities -constituted the norm. Even so, the Venetian authorities in Crete had made attempts as early as 1318 to formalize trade relations with Menteshe (Zachariadou 1983) . As Zachariadou (1983) suggests, it is not obvious that these efforts ultimately yielded anything, but we do know that Crete did establish formal trade relations with Menteshe in 1331. We also know that in 1332 the Pope and the Venetian authorities in Venice impressed the Venetians in Crete into service in the Sancta Unio, a "naval crusade" in the Aegean, against the various Turkish beyliks. The Cretans openly revolted in response to the efforts of the Venetian authorities to raise financing and build vessels to support the crusade, but the Sancta Unio managed to launch naval activities in 1334. The authorities in Crete managed to re-establish trade relations with Menteshe in 1337, and they also concluded a treaty with the Turks of Aydin that same year. By 1339, however, the Turks renewed massive raids across the Aegean, and it is not obvious that trade between Crete and the various beyliks had recovered until the late 1340's.
The upshot of all of this is that merchants operating in Crete perceived and exploited at least two clear windows of opportunity in 1331 and 1337 to trade with Menteshe and Aydin. Debt contracts typically did not explicitly indicate rates of interest but rather indicated that agents would reimburse their lenders according to "customary" rates. In 1331 and 1337-1339, however, almost all debt contracts recorded by all notaries feature explicit interest rates. The lowest of these rates was 20% over a term of six months. (See Figure 1. ) In 1338, for example, more than 60% of the contracts in the data set are not merely debt contracts but are debt contracts that explicitly indicate interest rates.
These data are consistent with agents and their investors participating in trade on the informational frontiers of the trade economy. They rushed in to participate in trade between Crete and Turkish beyliks. The data reveal that agents and their investors tended to organize trade through debt rather than commenda. Moreover, agents seemingly bid up interest rates beyond "customary" rates. Crusading activities in the mid-1330's and renewed hostilities in 1339 disrupted the trade.
Trade along Convoy Routes
The contract data from 1278-1400 do not explicitly indicate whether or not contracting parties coordinated their trade ventures with maritime convoys, but the 56 contracts in the data from 1190-1220 are explicit. Thirty-three of the 56 contracts involved ventures coordinated around convoys. Of these 33 contracts, 32 were commenda. (See Table 3 .) In contrast, twenty-three contracts do not indicate convoys. Of these 23, 12 were commenda and 11 were debt contracts.
The suggestion is plain: Agents traveling with other agents along convoy routes to commonly trade in commodities enabled merchants to tap into informal sources of information. The information enabled them to detect, if not verify, cheating. The ability to detect cheating enabled them and their agents to commit to terms of contract by which merchants' payoffs depended on agents' reports of transactions that merchants could neither observe nor verify. In contrast, merchants could neither observe, verify nor detect transactions conducted off of the convoy routes, in which case they appealed to debt contracts, the mode of financing of last resort.
The Role of Family Relations
Many authors have suggested that family relations played a central role in ordering principalagent relations. For example, the fact that the Italian "merchant-banking houses" were centered around family relationships is striking, but even these operations depended on nonfamily members to conduct transactions that merchants could neither observe nor verify. The puzzle remains: How did merchants mitigate cheating?
The data from 1190-1220 speak to the role of family relations in mitigating cheating in principal-agent contracts. The data indicate that 18 of 122 contracts (15%) featured contracts between principals and agents who were related or, at least, shared the same surname.
10 (See Table 4 .) Of these 18 contracts, 16 (89%) were commenda. In contrast, of the remaining 104 contracts, 62 (60%) were commenda.
The point is that family members tended to secure the agency services of family members not through debt but through commenda contracts. This pattern alone is consistent with the idea that merchants exploited family relationships in environments in which cheating could be a problem. Further examination, however, suggests that one should qualify such candidate conclusions. Table 5 works off of the subset of 56 original contracts and indicates the crosstabulation of family relations by convoy. Of the 14 original contracts that featured family relationships, 10 were coordinated with convoy traffic. Even so, each of these 14 contracts were commenda. Four of the 14 contracts were not obviously coordinated with convoys, but a larger pattern becomes clear: contracting parties tended to assign family relations to commenda contracts for ventures conducted along convoy routes.
The data also reveal other structure specific to family relationships. Table 4 indicates not merely that family relations tended to line up with commenda but also that agents who were related to principals tended to be assigned to unilateral rather than bilateral commenda. Taken all together, the data suggest a simple narrative. Family members tended to use overseas trade ventures to give younger members, who may not have had much capital of their own to begin with, opportunities to build up capital and to gain experience. They gained their experience less in trade ventures that deviated from convoy routes but gained it mostly in the most secure types of trade -trade conducted along established convoy routes. That is not to say that family relationships did not serve an important role in mitigating cheating, but it would have been easier to suggest that the principal role of family relationships was to mitigate cheating were it the case that family members tended to be assigned to commenda contracts for ventures that did deviate from convoy routes.
Repeat Relationships
The point of this section is to demonstrate that, while repeated interactions were not infrequent, one-shot interactions dominated. Accordingly, reference to the contract alone, provide little guidance about how mechanisms that depended on repeated interactions supported exchange. One can imagine that relationships may have both supported and depended on interactions that included and extended beyond maritime contracts. Alternatively, one can imagine that the prospect of group sanctions -formal or informal sanctions imposed on the family, say -could support one-shot interactions between individuals. Absent further research, however, such speculations remain speculations. An alternative explanation developed here, of course, is that debt financing could support oneshot interactions, especially in environments in which investors would be poorly equipped to detect (much less verify) cheating.
The data from 1278-1400 include every contract available in the State Archives from the 30-year interval 1325-1355. In this section I use a subset of that interval, 1330-1355, to identify the frequency of contract dyads.
The data from 1330-1355 spans 900 contracts. Each contract, of course, featured at least one agent and one investor, but the prospect of repeat contract dyads (investor-agent pairs) implies that the 900 contracts might span fewer than 900 unique dyads. It turns out, however, that a contract joining m trading agents with n investors would span mxn dyads. Contracts did, in fact, often feature more one trading agent or more than one investor. Accordingly, the set of 900 contracts might then span more than 900 unique dyads. Even some number of dyads show up more than one time, the set of 900 contracts spans 1,405 unique dyads.
I assign to each unique dyad an indication of the number of times it appeared in the entire set of 1,701 contracts. Table 6 takes these frequencies and indicates which dyads that made multiple appearances in the complete dataset of 1,701 contracts also appear in the 900 contracts features in the interval 1330-1355. Of the 900 contracts from 1330-1355, 680 (75.6%) involved dyads that appeared only once in the entire dataset. These single-appearing dyads indicate instances of one-shot dealings between trading agents and investors. Meanwhile, one-sixth of the contracts (149 or 16.6%) involved at least one dyad that appeared in one other contract, and only one other contract, in the complete dataset.
Similarly, 44 contracts feature dyads that appeared three times in the dataset; 12 contracts featured dyads that appeared four times; 15 contracts feature dyads that appeared five times. No contracting dyad appeared more than five times in the entire dataset.
In Table 7 I turn from the frequency of unique dyads to the frequency of unique trading agents and investors. The 900 contracts featured in the interval 1330-1355 spans a set of 1,254 individuals. Most of these individuals appear exclusively as trading agents or exclusively as investors, but there are 55 individuals who show up as both an agent and investor at least one time. Accordingly, the sum of the column "Agent Count" and "Investor Count" does not correspond to the column "Person Count." Rather, the 55 individuals are double-counted in that they are included in the counts of 912 unique trading agents and 397 unique investors.
The principal observation is that more than 70% of agents and 70% of investors appear in only one contract. Specifically, 648 of 912 agents only appear one time, and 289 of 397 investors only appear once. Overall, more than 90% of unique individuals appear three or fewer times anywhere in the set of 900 contracts. Yet, a small number of individuals finance a disproportionate share of all contracts. Constantino Cutaioti, for example, appears as an investor in 57 contracts. (He also appears one time as a trading agent.) His father, Giovanni Cutaioti appears 52 times as an investor. All together, the ten investors who appear most frequently appear in possibly as many as 284 of the 900 contracts (31.6%). Meanwhile, the ten most active agents appear in as many as 105 of the 900 contracts (11.7%).
In multinomial probit analyses, some of which are presented below, I include variables that exploit the frequencies of dyads, agents, and investors. I also include variables that intendedly measure agents' and principals' experience, the suggestion being that more experienced trade functionaries may have had time to develop networks of relationships that span overseas markets, and these networks may have constituted sources of information that they could use to motivate and support contracting. What one finds is that more active agents and investors were more likely to finance ventures with debt rather than with equity-like commenda, but the effects are modest. The episodic nature of trade opportunities was a more important driver in the selection of contracts.
Estimation
The tables presented in part 3 feature patterns that suggest how the sometimes-stable, usuallyepisodic nature of trade informed the contract selection problem. This section features multinomial probit analyses that elaborate on the episodic nature of trade. I assemble regressors that demonstrate both fitful changes, year on year, in the trading environment as well as fitful shifts in the volume of trade. The analyses also account for repeated relationships between trading agents and investors as well as for the experience (repeated appearances) of individuals in the contract data.
Contract selection: 1330 -1355
The first analysis is limited to 1330-1355, because the data from this interval are representative of the volume of economic activity, although I note that all results reported here obtain in estimations involving other intervals including 1320-1370 (1,167 contracts), 1320-1360 (1,082 contracts), and 1330-1370 (1,059 contracts).
11 The construction of some regressors depends on a discrete measure of time (calendar years) whereas others depend on a much finer partition of time (a time index measured in days). Measuring certain quantities on an annual basis is sensible in that trade activity was seasonal. It was seasonal, because many of the commodities being traded were agricultural and thus subject to seasonal patterns of production. Further, seaborne transportation was also subject to seasonal patterns.
The multinomial probit analyses characterize selection of three types of contracts: equity-like schemes (commenda), pooling contracts, and debt. I list the regressors here:
Trade Volume The number of maritime contracts per notary-day in a given year.
Repeat Relation
The maximum of the frequencies with which agent-investor dyads featured in a contract appeared anywhere in the complete set of 1,701 contracts.
Agent Experience
The maximum among agents in the contract of the the number of days from first appearance of any one agent in the data set to the date of the contract.
Investor Experience
The maximum among investors in the contract of the the number of days from first appearance of any one investor in the data set to the date of the contract.
Time Trend Measured in days.
Year dummies: Dummy variables for each year featuring more than 40 contracts in the interval 1330 -1355.
1331
Trade treaty with the Turkish beylik of Menteshe.
1332
Naval crusade against Turks in the Aegean commences.
1335
Naval crusade fleet disbanded.
1338
Trade treaties with the Turkish beyliks of Menteshe and Aydin in 1337.
1339
War with Turks in the Aegean renews.
1346
Crete re-establishes trade links with the Turkish beylik of Menteshe.
1347
Black Death invades the Aegean.
1348
Crete re-establishes trade links with the Turkish beylik of Aydin.
1349
Other Binary Indicators:
Contract Cluster
Identicates whether or not the contract features agents or investors common to other, simultaneous contracts.
Same Vessel
Indicates whether or not the contracted agents venture forth on a vessel common to other contracts.
demonstrate much variation, year on year, in the proportion of contracts dedicated to maritime trade as well some variation in the total number of contracts.
Convoy
Indicates whether or not the contracted agents venture forth in a cluster of vessels common to other contracts.
Egypt
Indicates whether or not a stated itinerary included a site in Egypt.
Menteshe
Indicates whether or not a stated itinerary included a site in the Turkish beyklik of Menteshe.
Aydin
Indicates whether or not a stated itinerary included a site in the Turkish beyklik of Aydin.
Rhodes
Indicates whether or not a stated itinerary included Rhodes.
Cyprus
Indicates whether or not a stated itinerary included a site in Cyprus.
Black Sea
Indicates whether or not a stated itinerary included a site on the Black Sea.
Venice
Indicates whether or not a stated itinerary included Venice.
Constantinople
Indicates whether or not a stated itinerary included Constantinople.
In the second segment of analysis I return to the interval of 1190 -1220. Multinomial probit analysis yields no surprises. It corroborates the results suggested by the cross-tabulations presented above.
The regressor Trade Volume as well as the year dummy variables characterize dynamic influences on contract selection -shifts in the trading environment and important episodic shifts in trade -in an otherwise static estimation framework. One might prefer to employ methods that directly accommodate time, but the data are not amenable to such methods. Accordingly, the estimation strategy employed here amounts to treating the dataset as static. In particular, the strategy amounts to interpreting year-on-year variation in trade volumes as the opening and closing of windows of investment opportunities. Large trade volumes, for example, sometimes reflected the renewing of trade relations with Turkish beyliks after a hiatus of some years. Parties would pile in en masse to exploit such opportunities, but investing anew amounted to participating in a trade that offered less in the way of institutional supports of the sort that trade in a stationary environment might have afforded.
The year dummies span the wave of plague that washed over the Mediterranean in 1347 and 1348. They also capture the many fitful renewals of trade with Turkish beyliks -renewals that succeeded each installment in a sequence of wars between Christian powers in the Aegean and various Turkish powers. Tables 8 and 9 feature marginal effects estimated from a nested sequence of two specifications. The second specification (Table 9) includes the destination dummies. The real focus, however, is on Table 8 . Destinations are endogenous but are included only to demonstrate the robustness of the results relating to the Trade Volume and the other regressors. Both specifications exclude dummies for years preceding 1338, because pooling contracts did not appear until then.
The principal results are as follows:
Result 1: Each flurry of investing activity was financed with debt, not commenda.
An increase in maritime contracting was accompanied by a decrease in commenda contracting and a comparably-sized increase in debt financing. Specifically, a 10% increase in the volume of maritime contracts per notary-day (Trade Volume) would correspond to a 9.5% decrease in financing by commenda contract and an 11.1% increase in debt financing. Both figures are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Result 2: Repeat relations show no discernible effect on contract selection.
The marginal effects corresponding to Repeat Relation are both small and statistically insignificant.
Result 3: Neither agent experience nor investor experience demonstrate a discernible effect on contract selection.
The marginal effects corresponding to Agent Experience and Investor Experience are both small and statistically insignificant.
Result 4: Parties shift out of debt contracts and into pooling contracts in the aftermath of plague.
Trade volumes in some of these years may have been high, but between 1347 through 1349, parties were about 30% less likely to finance ventures with debt and 25% more likely to finance ventures with pooling contracts. All the results are significant at the 1% level. Table 10 features marginal effects from a sequence of two nested multinomial probits. Four binary regressors are featured:
Contract selection: 1190 -1220

Post-1204
Distinguishes the regime post-Fourth Crusade from pre-Fourth Crusade.
Relation
Indicates whether or not an agent and investor were related.
Egypt
Indicates whether or not a stated itinery included a site in Egypt.
Again, the selection of itineraries -in this case, "Egypt" -is endogenous but Egypt is included in the second specification to demonstrate robustness as well as to demonstrate consistency with the results featured in cross-tabulations.
The principal result is that the post-1204 regime constituted not merely a expansion of trade opportunities but an expansion accompanied by the extension of institutional supports. The new regime in Constantinople post-1204 was designed to support Venetian trade in the Aegean, in Constantinople and into the Black Sea. Thus, while expansion alone might have prompted a shift into debt financing, the fact that the trade was heavily supported enabled extension of commenda contracting to the frontiers of the Venetian trade economy.
The other results obtain: investors tended to finance family members with unilateral commenda, not with debt. Similarly, the trade with Egypt tended to be financed with unilateral commenda, not with debt.
Conclusion
The research presented here provides clues to how parties enabled exchange in what Dixit (2004) might recognize as "lawless" environments. While it is uncontroversial to suggest that both formal and informal institutions can go some way toward enabling merchants to organize complex exchange, it is also reasonable to suggest that contracting parties could enable exchange in environments in which formal or informal enforcement processes may not have been feasible. This is what makes the appeal to debt to finance trade ventures interesting: it required little institutional support, and, indeed, it constituted an important means of mobilizing investment for overseas trade ventures.
The natural experiments pertaining to the trade with Egypt tell much of the story. In environments in which parties could detect (if not verify) cheating, they could appeal to equity-like schemes (commenda) and share risk. The suggestion is that risk-sharing was, indeed, an important feature of contracting. Even so, risk-sharing did not dominate. The data also suggest that in environments in which parties could not detect cheating, debt financing prevailed.
In all of this one should keep in mind that formal institutions did exist. The Venetian Republic, for example, did maintain courts and other institutions for supporting economic activity. One might characterize governance in Venice as "Government of the Merchants, By the Merchants, and For the Merchants." Even so, we do not know much about what formal Venetian institutions actually did. We do not know, for example, much about how merchants used courts to process claims relating to maritime commerce. While formal processes surely did serve some purposes, the evidence here suggests how merchants and their agents could have enabled exchange in environments situated well beyond the shadow of these formal processes. The notations ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table 9 Specification 2: 1330 -1355
The notations ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The notations ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
